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Note
State Action Immunity and
Municipalities: The Sherman Act
Looks for New Territory
Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous exemptions from the antitrust laws have been recog-
nized to facilitate certain activities which cannot (or for various
reasons, should not) be carried on in a competitive atmosphere.'
In Parker v. Brown,2 the Supreme Court recognized that federal
and state governments would not be subject to the antitrust laws
for official governmental activities. Under the so-called Parker
"state action" exemption, the Court held that a state was exempt
from prosecution when it acted through its legitimate state agen-
cies or officers pursuant to legislative authority.
3
During the twenty years following the decision, Parker drew lit-
tle attention. Recently, however, the state action exemption has
been a highly litigated antitrust area.4 Many of these decisions
have centered on whether the state required the anticompetitive
activity or merely permitted the conduct without any specific stat-
utory authorization.5 The Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar6 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
7
seem to dispel the uncertainty by advocating that the anticompeti-
tive activity should be "compelled" by the state before immunity
will be granted. In its most recent decision, City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.,8 the Supreme Court recognized that
1. For a complete discussion of the numerous exemptions, see J. VON KAL Now-
SKI, ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION (16F Busmss ORGANIZATIONS
1978).
2. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
3. Id. at 351-52.
4. See notes 29-31 & accompanying text infra.
5. Id.
6. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
7. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
8. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
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the proper standard is whether the state "directed" or "author-
ized" the anticompetitive practice.9 However, the courts' inability
to adequately handle the myriad factual issues which plaintiffs
have attempted to distinguish from those cases illustrates that the
uncertainty remains. Particularly, there has been much difficulty
in consistently applying the state action doctrine to municipalities.
Such was the case in Whitworth v. Perkins,0 in which the fifth cir-
cuit was presented with the issue whether the acts of a municipal-
ity were immune under Parker. The case provided the court with
an opportunity to articulate which factors are relevant to a consid-
eration of the immunity defense. However, as this note will dis-
cuss, the court failed to do so and thus added to the existing
uncertainty in the area.
II. FACTS
In 1961, defendant Perkins founded the city of Impact, Texas, on
the border of the city of Abilene in Taylor County. Until that time
the county was one in which alcoholic beverages were not sold."
Under the appropriate Texas statutes, 12 the city of Impact passed a
provision allowing for the sale of alcohol, thereby creating "an 'oa-
sis' on the boundary of a 'dry' city in a 'dry' county.' 3 In conjunc-
tion with the approval of the sale of alcohol, the city council
adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance which prohibited the
sale of alcohol in areas of the city which were zoned residential.
In 1967, plaintiff Whitworth bought a plot of land in Impact
which was zoned residential. Eight years later, Whitworth sought
to open a liquor store on his property and filed an application with
the county judge for the necessary approval.14 Not surprisingly,
the request was denied in accordance with the zoning ordinance.
Whitworth then brought suit against the city of Impact, its mayor,
secretary, and three city councilmen, alleging a conspiracy in re-
9. Id. at 1138. See note 46 & accompanying text infra.
10. 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 379.
12. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 666-32 (Vernon Penal Aux. Pamp. 1977; to be
codified in TEx. ALco. BE V. CODE ANN.).
13. 559 F.2d at 380.
14. TE REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 667-6 (Vernon Penal Aux. Pamp. 1977; to be
codified in TEx. ALco. BEy. CODE ANN.). According to article 667-6, if the
application is approved after the initial hearing before the county judge, the
judge will then recommend to the Texas Liquor Control Board that a license
should be granted. However, the board has the power to refuse a license
under discretionary authority granted it by article 667-6(c). If the application
is denied by the judge or by the board, the applicant may, within 30 days,
appeal to the district court in the county in which the application is made, as
provided in article 667-6(e).
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straint of trade in regard to the sale of alcoholic beverages.
15
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that
a valid city ordinance was in effect. Therefore, the court had no
justification for looking beyond the ordinance into "the motives or
the integrity of the members of the municipal legislative body in
the exercise of their legislative powers."'
16
Ill THE DECISION
In reversing the district court's dismissal, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit initially stated that the zoning ordinance did
not automatically grant the defendants immunity when, according
to the allegations, the ordinance itself was the result of the alleged
conspiracy to restrain trade.17 The court supported its conclusion
by a careful analysis of Parker v. Brown,18 in which it attempted to
determine whether the Impact ordinance was adopted under the
guise of state action' 9 and, therefore, immune from the antitrust
laws. Distinguishing Parker from the facts in Whitworth, the fifth
circuit found that while Parker involved a state program imple-
mented for the public welfare in conjunction with the United
States Department of Agriculture, Whitworth involved the act of a
municipality, allegedly in a conspiracy with private individuals
and with no manifest state or federal approval.
20
Due to these important differences, the court in Whitworth rea-
soned that an automatic exemption under Parker should not be
granted. Rather, on the basis of prior fifth circuit decisions in
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v Aluminum Co. of
America,21 Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell,22 and City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.,23 "[a] thoughtful analysis is called
for to ensure that it is a bonafide governmental decision for which
exemption is being sought."24
Moreover, further analysis was necessary, according to the
court, because the facts of Whitworth did not involve the direct
action of the state, but that of a municipality. Accordingly, on re-
mand the state statutes had to be scrutinized by the lower court to
15. 559 F.2d at 380.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
19. 559 F.2d at 380.
20. Id. at 380-81.
21. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
22. 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975).
23. 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 98 S. Ct 1123 (1978).
24. 559 F.2d at 381.
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determine whether the municipality was acting pursuant to the
powers granted it by the legislature.25 The court added that if the
lower court reached the issue of immunity, it should also consider
the recent Supreme Court decisions in Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co.,26 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.27 Stating that these two
decisions "clarified the scope" of the Parker doctrine, the court
nonetheless failed to explain exactly how Cantor and Bates shed
new light on the area.28
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Immunity of Municipalities
Although Whitworth is not subject to question on the conclu-
sion that immunity is not to be granted automatically, it is subject
to question on a number of other issues. First, the fifth circuit
made a simple comparison between the facts of Parker and
Whitworth and thereby concluded that since the facts of
Whitworth were clearly distinguishable, immunity should not be
granted. In so doing, the court ignored the important standards
which have been set out in the Supreme Court's recent decisions
involving the Parker doctrine. In addition, although the fifth cir-
cuit commented on the necessity of a close analysis of the relevant
state statutes, it failed to consider the Texas statutes which au-
thorized the city council to adopt the zoning restrictions. As a re-
suilt, little guidance was provided on the methods of analysis
regarding the immunity question and the requisite amount of state
involvement necessary for immunity to be granted.
The foundation for the grant of immunity under a claim of state
action was set forth in Parker v. Brown. 29 In Parker, the Supreme
Court held that a California raisin marketing program designed to
stabilize the industry did not violate the antitrust laws because
"[t]he Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state."30 According to the decision in Parker,
immunity will be granted for an otherwise illegal act under the an-
25. Id.
26. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
27. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
28. 559 F.2d at 381.
29. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker was based on Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908
(C.C.D.S.C. 1895), and Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). In Olsen, the
Court held that the licensing ofTexas harbor pilots by the state of Texas was
not invalid under the Sherman Act on the ground that "no monopoly or com-
bination in a legal sense can arse from the fact that the duly authorized
agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon
them by law." Id. at 345.
30. 317 U.S. at 351. Chief Justice Burger, delivering the opinion of the Court in
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titrust laws if the program or act derives "its authority and its effi-
cacy from the legislative command of the state."
'31
Under this broad state action exemption enunciated in Parker,
it is not surprising that the lower courts' interpretations were often
inconsistent and broad in their application.3 2 On the basis of
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), interpreted Parker as hold-
ing
that an anticompetitive marketing program which "derived its au-
thority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state"
was not a violation of the Sherman Act because the Act was intended
to regulate private practices and not to prohibit a State from impos-
ing a restraint as an act of government.
Id. at 788.
31. 317 U.S. at 352. For a more complete analysis of Parker, see Handler, The
Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 CoLum. L.
REV. 1 (1976); Slater, Antitrust & Government Action: A Formula for
Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. L. REv. 71 (1974); Verkuil, State Action,
Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 CoLum. L. REv.
328 (1975).
32. See, e.g., Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th
Cir. 1977) (immunity denied where state did not require or intend the an-
ticompetitive activity by the NCAA). Compare Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (immunity denied where Cana-
dian law did not compel the discriminatory pricing); United States v. National
Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (professional society cannot
prohibit competitive bidding among its members); Boddicker v. Arizona
State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977) (local dental group not im-
mune where it required its members to join a national dental association as a
condition of membership); Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d
1075 (4th Cir. 1976) (no immunity where state law merely allows the act, but
does not compel it); Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976) (state
statutes did not require the anticompetitive activity of a private party; there-
fore, no immunity); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (no
immunity for the city in its operation of municipal arenas and stadiums
where the act is not compelled by the state); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444
F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (no exemption for
the District of Columbia Armory Board where it granted an exclusive lease of
R.F.K. stadium to a football team); Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop.
Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968) (rebate program was not required by state
law and was, therefore, not immune); Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977) (no immunity for a state bar
association attempting to restrict the working of title opinions on the ground
that it constituted the practice of law); Brenner v. State Bd. of Motor Vehicle
Mfrs., Dealers & Salesmen, 413 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (state agency ex-
empt if its action is compelled by the state); United States v. Pacific S.W.
Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 801 (1973) (a
merger which was not compelled by state statute was not immune); Schenley
Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872
(D.N.J. 1967) (state of New Jersey merely allowed price fixing, but did not
compel such conduct and, therefore, no immunity); with Saenz v. University
Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973) (organization within the
university was granted immunity from an alleged conspiracy involving a
sponsored event); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,
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these lower court decisions, it is clear that a simple analysis of
Parker is not the end but rather the beginning of an exemption
analysis. Parker must currently be read in conjunction with the
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,33 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,34 and Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona.35 As a result, by simply comparing the facts in
Whitworth with Parker, and then denying that an exemption
could be based on the facts presented, the fifth circuit in
Whitworth failed to recognize the importance of the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncements on the issue of state action immu-
nity.
The current treatment of the state action exemption was initi-
ated in Goldfarb, in which the Supreme Court held that a state bar
association was not immune from the antitrust laws when it issued
minimum fee schedules for attorneys' services in the state of Vir-
ginia. Relying on Parker, Chief Justice Burger noted that the ini-
tial inquiry into whether the state bar was exempt from the
Sherman Act must center on "whether the activity is required by
the State acting as sovereign."3 6 Applying that standard, the
Court stated that there was no evidence of a state statute which
required the anticompetitive conduct and concluded that "it is not
enough that ... anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state ac-
tion; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direc-
424 F.2d 25 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (immunity granted only
where the state's legislature affirmatively provides for comprehensive regula-
tion); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.
1970) (body created by the legislature for the purposes of public transporta-
tion was immune); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) (immunity granted air-
port officials entering into a price fixing agreement as conducting a valid gov-
ernmental function); Parnlelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961) (wrongful conduct of an Interstate
Commerce Commission member held immune); Alphin v. Henson, 392 F.
Supp. 813 (D. Md. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1976) (municipality not
liable under the antitrust laws for the anticompetitive acts of its airport man-
ager under the immunity doctrine); Trans World Assoc. v. City & County of
Denver [1974-2] Trade Cas. 75,293 (D. Colo. 1974) (where the legislature pro-
vides that the city shall run its airport, city is immune when it performs that
function); Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 362 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973)
(immunity granted where the city acted within its powers in exclusively leas-
ing the city coliseum to a single wrestling promoter); Miley v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957) (immunity granted state
insurance commission for alleged conspiracy with private parties); Anderson
v. Comm'n on Special Revenue, [1977-2] Trade Cas. 1 61,726 (Super. Ct. Conn.
1977) (state commission exempt due to specific statutory authority).
33. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
34. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
35. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
36. 421 U.S. at 790.
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tion of the State acting as a sovereign."
37
In Cantor3 8 the anticompetitive conduct was the distribution of
free light bulbs by an electric company, which allegedly foreclosed
competition in the light bulb market. In the plurality opinion writ-
ten by Justice Stevens, the Court held that although a private elec-
tric company was regulated by the state, the specific
anticompetitive activities were not compelled by the state and
should, therefore, not be immune from the antitrust laws.39 The
Court reasoned that although the distribution of electricity was
regulated by the state of Michigan, the relevant statutes did not
make any reference to light bulbs. In addition, although the cost
of the light bulbs was included in the rates approved by the Michi-
gan Public Service Commission and these rates could not be ad-
justed without commission approval, the Court nevertheless
concluded that the mere acquiescence in the program does not sat-
isfy the "compelled" standard.40 The Court also noted that a criti-
cal factor in Cantor was the fact that the defendant was not a
public official or agency acting within a scope of authority granted
by the legislature, but rather was a private party exercising "suffi-
cient freedom of choice to enable the Court to conclude that he
should be held responsible for the consequences of his decision."
'4 1
In Bates the Supreme Court distinguished Goldfarb and
Cantor and held that the state bar, by prohibiting attorney adver-
tising, was not subject to the antitrust laws. Unlike Goldfarb, the
state bar's restrictive measures in Bates were compelled by the
state because the rules were ordered by the Arizona Supreme
Court.42 The Court distinguished Cantor on the basis of three is-
sues: (1) the claim was against a private party in Cantor, whereas
the claim in Bates was against the state; (2) the state did not have
a distinct regulatory interest in light bulbs while the state had a
great concern in the control of lawyers; and (3) the action was
compelled by the state through the Arizona Supreme Court and
not merely permitted as in Cantor.43
Subsequent to Whitworth, the Supreme Court decided City of
37. Id. at 791.
38. For a more complete discussion of Cantor, see Dorman, State Action Immu-
nity; A Problem Under Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 503
(1977); Recent Development, Antitrust Law--Immunity--Anticompetitive
Activities Required of State-Regulated Public Utility Not Immune from Anti-
trust Attack, 62 CoRNELL I. REV. 628 (1977).
39. 428 U.S. at 593, 604.
40. Id. at 592-93.
41. Id. at 593.
42. 433 U.S. at 359-60.
43. Id. at 361-62.
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Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,44 which involved the
question whether a city operating a power plant was automatically
exempt from the antitrust laws under Parker. The plurality opin-
ion written by Justice Brennan held that municipalities are not ex-
empt simply because of their status as subdivisions of state
government. Rather, they will be exempt only "when it is found
'from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a par-
ticular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action
complained of.' -4 5 The Court recognized that the municipality is
not required to specifically base its exemptions on an express leg-
islative mandate in order to qualify for the Parker exemption.
However, the subdivision must present some "evidence that the
State authorized or directed a given municipality to act as it did."46
Because Goldfarb held that the standard is whether the act of
the municipality was "compelled" by the legislature and not
merely "authorized," it could be argued that Lafayette enunciates
a broader standard. However, a closer reading of Goldfarb sug-
gests that where the state or one of its subdivisions is involved, the
proper standard most likely will be whether the conduct was "au-
thorized." This interpretation is supported by the Court's intima-
tion in Goldfarb that had the Virginia Supreme Court
recommended the fee schedule, pursuant to its authority to super-
vise the practice of law, the state supreme court would have been
immune from the antitrust laws.4 7
Since the Supreme Court sought to clarify the scope of Parker
in Goldfarb, Cantor, Bates and Lafayette, Parker simply cannot be
relied upon by itself as the determinative case in deciding whether
a municipality will be deemed immune from the antitrust laws, as
it was in Whitworth. Rather, before a "test" is to be applied, the
defendant must be categorized according to its character as either
a private party acting under the direction of the state, as in Cantor,
or a state acting through an agent under the direction of the state's
legislature or constitution, as in Parker and Bates. This initial de-
termination is necessary because Cantor and Bates illustrate that
44. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
45. Id. at 1138 (quoting 532 F.2d at 434).
46. Id. at 1137.
47. In Goldfarb, the fee schedule was not specifically authorized by the State
Bar or the Virginia Supreme Court, but rather was issued by the County Bar.
In this context, the Court stated that "although the State Bar apparently has
been granted the power to issue ethical opinions, there is no indication in this
record that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the opinions." 421 U.S. at
791. The fifth circuit agreed with this distinction in City of Lafayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 98 S. Ct. 1123
(1978), as have a number of commentators. See Dorman, supra note 38, at
510; Handler, supra note 31, at 12-13.
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an important consideration which has affected the Court's analysis
is whether the state was in fact named as the defendant in the liti-
gation. If the state is not the defendant, Cantor indicates that the
defendant's conduct as a private party is more likely to be held in
violation of the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine.
48
Although Whitworth involved a subdivision of state govern-
ment, the standard of review should have begun with deciding
whether, in fact, the state of Texas was legitimately involved in the
alleged violative conduct through statutory authorization. In its
analysis of whether the state of Texas had authorized the alleged
anticompetitive act, the court in Whitworth found that on the basis
of a simple comparison of the facts of Parker, this threshold re-
quirement was not met because unlike Parker, "there [was] no
such federal, or even state conduct suggesting tacit approval."49
This analysis appears tenuous because not only did the court fail
to make a close examination of the relevant Texas statutes to sub-
stantiate this claim, but such analysis represents a substantial de-
parture from the standard of review used by the fifth circuit in its
recent decisions involving state action. In City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.,50 the fifth circuit recognized that "a
subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt
from the operation of the antitrust laws. Rather, a district court
must ask whether the state legislature contemplated a certain type
of anticompetitive restraint."5' 1 Thus, the fifth circuit's analysis of
state action immunity prior to Whitworth had recognized the im-
portance of determining whether the governmental body's an-
ticompetitive activity was within the clear intent of the state
legislature.
5 2
If a similar approach had been adopted in Whitworth, the city
council's enactment of the zoning ordinance would have been
found to be clearly within the intent of the Texas legislature. Gen-
erally, the Texas statutes authorize cities to restrict the use of
property located within their boundaries.53 More specifically, the
Texas Liquor Control Act5 4 provides:
48. 428 U.S. at 591, 610-11.
49. 559 F.2d at 381.
50. 532 F.2d 431. (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
51. Id. at 434. The Supreme Court in Lafayette specifically adopted this lan-
guage in holding that an "adequate state mandate ... exists when it is found
'from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular
area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of."' 98
S. Ct. at 1138 (quoting 532 F.2d at 434).
52. 532 F.2d at 434. The fifth circuit had previously used the "legislative intent"
approach in Jeffery v. Southwestern Bell, 518F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1011(a) (Vernon 1963).
54. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 666 to 667 (Vernon Penal Aux. Pamp. 1977; to
be codified in TaX. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN.).
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All incorporated cities and towns are hereby authorized to regulate the
sale of beer within the corporate limits of such cities and towns by charter
amendment or ordinances;... such cities and towns may also designate
certain zones in the residential section or sections of said cities and towns
... where such sales may be prohibited.
5 5
It is firmly established that the state's power to zone is a valid
exercise of the state's police power to protect the public welfare.
56
Through legislative mandate, the state of Texas has specifically
delegated zoning authority to the municipalities subject, of course,
to the direction of the legislature.5 7 Accordingly, there existed ex-
press state authorization allowing the Impact city council to zone
within the city limits.
B. Scope of Authority
Under prior fifth circuit decisions, the immunity analysis would
have concluded after the "legislative intent" standard had been
satisfied.58 However, not only is it difficult for courts to determine
the intent of the legislature,59 but more importantly, Bates and
Goldfarb share the common opinion that the determination of in-
tent should simply represent the beginning of an exemption analy-
sis.60 As a result, the state could not be said to be involved in
Whitworth unless it was clear that the Impact city council acted
within its scope of authority when it passed the allegedly anticom-
petitive zoning ordinance. A clear resolution of this issue is im-
portant because if immunity from the antitrust laws is to be
granted only for actions pursuant to the state's legislative prescrip-
tion, action outside the grant of authority should obviously not be
protected.
The "scope of authority" analysis would first focus on the zon-
ing process and at what points the city council could have ex-
ceeded its authority. The discussion would then be directed to the
55. Id. art. 667-10.
56. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (enactment of zon-
ing regulations is a valid act under the municipality's police power).
57. Coffee City v. Thompson, 535 S.W.2d 758, 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
58. "In our opinion, though, it is not necessary to point to an express statutory
mandate for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will
suffice if the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent."
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.
1976), affd, 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978). The Supreme Court expressly approved
this analysis. 98 S. Ct. at 1138.
59. Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt
From Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547,
1565 (1977).
60. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (other factors considered
were whether the state was the actual defendant and whether the state had
an independent regulatory interest); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975) (the threshold inquiry was whether the state compelled the act).
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issue of council misconduct and the probability that it acted
outside its scope of authority. After litigation, the city of Impact
was held to be validly incorporated in the state of Texas.61 A short
time later, in a local option election, as required by state law,62 the
voters of the city of Impact approved the sale of liquor in the com-
munity. Also, as required by statute,63 the city council adopted a
comprehensive zoning ordinance which prohibited the sale of alco-
hol in areas zoned residential. Of these three acts, only the adop-
tion of the comprehensive zoning ordinance was not made
pursuant to an election. Therefore, according to Texas law, this
was the only point upon which any misconduct of the Impact city
council could be based in connection with the sale of liquor.
In its exercise of the zoning power, the council must act in rela-
tion to the public welfare, health and safety.6 Due to these amor-
phous guidelines, the courts have recognized that when reviewing
a council's decision on zoning, the council should not be overruled
unless it can be shown that the zoning action was arbitrary or ca-
pricious, thereby amounting to an abuse of discretion.65 This pol-
icy of limited review has been recognized by the fifth circuit.66
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that "if the validity of the
61. Perkins v. State, 367 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1963). Under TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
arts. 1133 to 1140 (Vernon 1963), a city cannot be incorporated without a vote
of the residents living within the boundary of the proposed city.
62. TEx. Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 666-32 (Vernon Penal Aux. Pamp. 1977; to be
codified in TEx. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN.).
63. The statute provides in part:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and designed to . . . promote health and the general welfare
.... Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration,
among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the
value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throughout such municipality ....
Tax. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011(c) (Vernon 1963).
64. City of San Antonio v. Lanier, 542 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); McWhor-
ter v. City of Winnsboro, 525 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Burkett v. City
of Texarkana, 500 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
65. City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.), appeal dismissed,
411 U.S. 901 (1972); Royal Crest, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 520 S.W.2d 858
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Thompson v. City of Palestine, 502 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974); City of San
Antonio v. Hunt, 458 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); City of Farmers Branch
v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Wallace v. Daniel, 409
S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Burford v. Austin, 379 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964); Pitre v. Baker, 111 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
66. Blackman v. City of Big Sandy, 507 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1975); Sough Gwinnett
Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1974); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d
745 (5th Cir. 1973).
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legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable,
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."
67
C. Existence of a Conspiracy
Against this background, the plaintiff in Whitworth alleged that
the council's adoption of an ordinance prohibiting the sale of alco-
hol on premises zoned residential was an integral part of a conspir-
acy in restraint of trade.68 Before reaching the conspiracy
question, the initial issue to be resolved was whether the Impact
zoning ordinance failed the standard zoning test as being arbitrary,
capricious and not in relation to the welfare of the community.
The fifth circuit was presented with a similar claim in Blackman v.
City of Big Sandy.69 In Blackman, the court held that the city
council's zoning plan which prohibited the sale of alcohol on resi-
dential property was valid because "the City might be legitimately
concerned about the presence of a liquor establishment and its ac-
companying traffic in the midst of homes, churches and a
school."7 0 In support of its decision, the court cited Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas,71 in which the Supreme Court held that "the
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and un-
healthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." 72
Considering not only the recognized presumption of validity
that the city council's legislative decisions have, but also the broad
power to zone in the public interest, it is quite apparent that the
city council had the authority to regulate the use of property, in-
cluding the sale of liquor. In addition, as compared with other re-
cent cases on this point, the Impact city council's zoning action did
not have the characteristics which have been regarded as ques-
tionable. The zoning ordinance represented a legislative rather
than a proprietary function,73 and it was not an action in the course
67. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). See also Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
68. 559 F.2d at 379-80.
69. 507 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1975).
70. Id. at 936.
71. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
72. Id. at 9.
73. "Proprietary functions" are defined in Texas as "those which are intended
primarily for the private advantage and benefit of persons within the corpo-
rate limits of the municipality as distinguished from that of the general pub-
lic." Pontarelli Trust v. City of McAllen, 465 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971). A "governmental function" of a city has been recognized to include
those activities "enjoined upon it by law and are given it by the state as a part
of the state's sovereignty, to be exercised by the city in the interest of the
general public." Id. at 807.
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of the purchase or sale of goods by the municipality.74 Both of
these factors have been mentioned as activities which foster the
conclusion that the municipality should not be granted immu-
nity.75
Even accepting the fact that the Impact city council was author-
ized by the state of Texas to zone, and that the city council's deci-
sion had a presumption of validity, it remains to be determined
whether the council nonetheless adopted the ordinance pursuant
to a conspiracy in restraint of trade.76 Concluding that there were
issues of fact present which warranted a judicial hearing of the
plaintiff's case, the court in Whitworth stated that "the mere pres-
ence of the zoning ordinance does not necessarily insulate the de-
fendants from antitrust liability where, as here, the plaintiff
If the subject of the plaintiff's claim had involved a proprietary function of
the Impact city council which could have otherwise been performed by pri-
vate enterprise, there is authority for the proposition that the municipality is
not regarded as acting as an agent of the state and, therefore, should be liable
as an individual or corporation would be for the same acts. Mr. Chief Justice
Burger expressly adopted this approach in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1141-43 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See also Barnes v. Merritt, 428 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1970); Crow v. City of San
Antonio, 157 Tex. 250, 301 S.W.2d 628 (1957).
However, the dissent in Lafayette described the distinction between pro-
prietary and governmental functions "as a quagmire ... with distinctions so
finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind
for adequate formulation." 98 S. Ct. at 1147 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
74. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977) (park
district operated retail stores selling golf equipment); Duke & Co. v. Foerster,
521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (municipality operating a sports arena, stadium
and airport); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (commercial transactions
with public officials); Azzaro v. Town of Branford, [1974-2] Trade Cas. 175,337
(D. Conn. 1974) (town purchasing fire and casualty insurance). But see
Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975) (cable
TV franchise issued by city council); Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Air Board, 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974) (airport); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc.
v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947
(1966) (airport); Trans World Assoc. v. City & County of Denver, [1974-2]
Trade Cas. 75,293 (D. Colo. 1974) (airport); Murdock v. City of Jacksonville,
361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (municipal arena).
75. See notes 73-74 & accompanying text supra.
76. Because this was an appeal from a summary judgment decision in favor of
the defendants, the appellate court's review should have centered on
whether triable issues of fact existed in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962), the
Supreme Court stated that in looking at the record in the manner most
favorable to the appealing party, "[s]ummary judgment should be entered
only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions filed in the
case 'show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' Id. at 467 (quot-
ing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
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asserts that the enactment of the ordinance was itself a part of the
alleged conspiracy to restrain trade. '77 In support of its position,
the court noted that the specific issue of whether immunity will be
extended to a state official who conspires with private parties had
not been decided by the Supreme Court and, therefore, should not
be quickly dismissed.7 8
Although it is accepted that a motion for summary judgment
should not be freely granted,79 the fifth circuit failed to enunciate
the standards which the lower court should follow at trial when
faced with the conspiracy issue. This lack of guidance will be im-
portant for two reasons. First, as is the case of the immunity ques-
tion in general,8 0 the conspiracy issue involving a governmental
body has been inconsistently interpreted by the courts. 81 Second,
although a court cannot anticipate every relevant issue, the fifth
circuit failed to mention the defense of immunity on the basis of
the Noerr-Pennington82 doctrine, which allows antitrust immunity
for private parties legitimately attempting to influence the deci-
sions of public officials.
Because the Supreme Court in Parker specifically refused to
decide the issue, the allegation of a conspiracy in which the state is
involved has, not surprisingly, been interpreted inconsistently. In
Duke & Co. v. Foerster,83 the allegation of a conspiracy was held to
state a claim of action where the act was not compelled by the
state and it was alleged that the governmental officials were parti-
cipating with private parties in a scheme to injure competition,
rather than merely being influenced by them.8 4 In an equally con-
vincing opinion, the court in Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford,
Inc.,85 held that where genuine political activities are involved,
valid attempts to influence the decisions of a political body do not
fall within the meaning of "conspiracy" for the purposes of an anti-
77. 559 F.2d at 379.
78. In Parker, the Supreme Court stated that "we have no question of the state
or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combina-
tion by others for restraint of trade." 317 U.S. at 351-52.
79. See note 76 & accompanying text supra.
80. See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 82-83 & accompanying text infra. •
82. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presi-
dents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
83. 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962); Harmon v. Valley Nat'1 Bank, 339 F.2d
564 (9th Cir. 1964).
84. 521 F.2d at 1281-82.
85. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975). .See also Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State
Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massa-
chusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
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trust claim.86 Briefly, the significance of these two cases for the
purposes of the present discussion is to illustrate the difficulty
which other courts have had in dealing with the conspiracy issue.
Because of this difficulty, the fifth circuit, at a minimum, should
have set out some preliminary standards on the conspiracy issue
to aid lower court review. As it now stands, the lower court, in
considering the other cases on this issue, could justifiably agree
with either Duke or Metro Cable.
In a related issue, the dilemma for the lower court in Whitworth
increases if the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is pleaded as an addi-
tional defense by the defendants. In essence, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine states that joint action by private parties to
influence the decisions of public officials will be immune from the
antitrust laws.8 7 However, this exemption is limited by the
"sham" exception, which will cause the exemption to be denied if,
among other things, the joint activity is merely an attempt to in-
jure competition by denying it equal access to the governmental
agency8 8 rather than a legitimate attempt to influence the deci-
sion-making process of a legislative body.89
By naming all of Impact's city officials as defendants, the plain-
tiff in Whitworth was clearly alleging that the officials had con-
spired with private parties to restrain trade in the sale of alcoholic
beverages. Therefore, Whitworth arguably represents a good ex-
ample of the type of conduct which the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
sought to exempt from the antitrust laws. This issue was
presented in Metro Cable Co. v. CA TV of Rockford, Inc.,90 in which
the plaintiff alleged that the city council and mayor, induced by
large campaign contributions from individuals, unreasonably de-
nied his application for a cable television license. The court recog-
nized that because the city council was a legislative body operating
in a political setting and the state statutes authorized the city
86. 516 F.2d at 230.
87. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
88. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972).
89. See generally Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, [1977-1] Trade Cas. 61,425 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Rush-
Hamption Indus., Inc. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19 (M.D. Fla.
1976); Foret v. Point Landing, Inc., [1976-2] Trade Cas. 61,106 (E.D. La. 1976);
B.A.M. Liquors, Inc. v. Satenstein, [1976-2] Trade Cas. 60,977 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex.
1976); REA Express, Inc. v. California Motor Transp. Co. [1975-2] Trade Cas.
60,386 (N.D. Cal. 1975); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451
(D. Minn. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 417 U.S. 901 (1974); United States v.
Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
90. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
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council to issue the cable television licenses, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine applied.91 As a result, the court concluded:
Nothing in the Noerr opinion or any other case of which we are aware
suggests any reason for believing that Congress, not having intended the
Sherman Act to apply to combined efforts to induce legislative action, did
intend the Act to apply if a member of the legislative body agreed to sup-
port those efforts.
92
This is not to argue that based on the similarity of Metro Cable,
the court in Whitworth should, therefore, exempt the defendants,
but rather it illustrates the potential complexity of Whitworth
which the fifth circuit failed to take into full account in its opinion.
In the meantime, although the Supreme Court in Lafayette has
held that municipalities are not automatically exempt, the proper
procedure by which the immunity question is to be analyzed
within the fifth circuit remains clouded, with few meaningful
guidelines of permissible conduct for potential litigants and mu-
nicipalities.
D. Application of Twenty-First Amendment
A final argument of possible relevance to Whitworth is that the
antitrust laws simply are not applicable because the act of the city
council was protected by the twenty-first amendment. 93 Section
two of the amendment states that "the transportation or importa-
tion into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."94 This provision has been in-
terpreted as providing the states with broad power to regulate the
use and distribution of liquor within their borders.9 5 As a result,
"'a state is totally unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause limi-
tations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for
use, distribution, or consumption within its borders.
'96
Although the states are authorized to regulate alcohol, the anti-
trust laws will not be automatically deemed inapplicable because
"the validity of a charge under the Sherman Law relating to intoxi-
cating liquors depends upon the utilization by a State of its consti-
tutional power under the Twenty-first Amendment.' 97 Therefore,
the question whether the antitrust laws should be set aside in
91. Id. at 229.
92. Id. at 230.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
94. Id.§ 2.
95. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324 (1964).
96. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964).
97. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 301 (1945).
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favor of the twenty-first amendment in Whitworth is narrowed to
questions of (1) whether the Impact city council acted pursuant to
a Texas state policy which sanctions the alleged anticompetitive
conduct; (2) whether the act can be characterized as within the
state's constitutional power under the twenty-first amendment
and (3) if so, whether the twenty-first amendment preempts the
commerce clause in this instance.
While the Texas courts have stated that municipalities do not
have the express power to issue or refuse liquor licenses,98 it is
evident that through the zoning power, cities do in fact control the
physical location of liquor establishments. This conclusion is di-
rectly reflected in the Texas Liquor Control Act.99
Therefore, it may be contended that by adopting the compre-
hensive zoning ordinance which prohibited the sale of alcohol on
lots zoned residential, the Impact city council was acting pursuant
to the state's overall regulatory policy which controls the sale of
alcohol. Because the issue whether the state has sanctioned the
activity is of critical importance to the application of the twenty-
first amendment, 100 it is clear that a more thorough analysis of the
Texas liquor statutes and the role of the city council in the regula-
tory scheme is needed. However, because the statutes specifically
authorized the actions of the Impact city council and there exists
"the added presumption in favor of the validity of the state regula-
tion in this area that the Twenty-First Amendment requires,"' 0 1 it
is likely that the antitrust laws would be rendered inapplicable.
V. CONCLUSION
In Whitworth v. Perkins the fifth circuit sought to remain con-
sistent with the present trend towards a more precise analysis of
the Parker state action immunity question. By applying this stan-
98. Davis v. Coffee City, 356 F. Supp. 550 (EfD. Tex. 1972); Munoz v. City of San
Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
99. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 667-10% (Vernon Penal Aux. Pamp. 1977; to be
codified in TEx. ALco. BEv. CODE ANN.). See note 55 & accompanying text
supra.
100. In order for the twenty-first amendment to preempt the application of the
antitrust laws, the state must exercise its twenty-first amendment powers so
that the specific anticompetitive conduct is sanctioned by the state's liquor
policy. See generally Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d 425
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Erie County Malt Beverage Distrib. Ass'n,
264 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1959); Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., [1975-
1] Trade Cas. 60,187 (D. Colo. 1975); B.A.M. Liquors, Inc. v. Satenstein, [1975-
1] Trade Cas. 60,248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); V. & L. Cicione Inc. v. C. Schmidt &
Sons, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fairfield County Beverage Dis-
trib., Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 378 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1974);
Schnapps Shop, Inc. v. H.W. Wright & Co., 377 F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1973).
101. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972).
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dard, the court correctly determined that there are important fac-
tors which a court must weigh before a municipality is to be
granted immunity from the antitrust laws. However, by resting its
decision on a simple comparison of the facts in Whitworth and
Parker, the court failed to fully consider the importance of the
Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the question of state
action immunity.
In addition, by refusing to consider the relevant Texas statutes
in order to determine the extent of the state's involvement and the
possible application of the Noerr-Pennington defense, the court
failed to provide a meaningful direction which would, at a mini-
mum, define the parameters of review for lower courts. The court
also failed to consider the argument that the antitrust laws might
simply be inapplicable in Whitworth because the Impact city coun-
cil was acting pursuant to the State's power to regulate alcohol
which is protected from federal intervention by the twenty-first
amendment. Overall, while it is now clear that municipalities are
not automatically exempt, the fifth circuit has increased the uncer-
tainty which presently exists on this question by denying the
lower courts and potential litigaits a modicum of guidance con-
cerning the proper analysis of an exemption question. Until the
issue is decisively concluded,
[e]ach time a cit grants an exclusive franchise, or chooses to provide a
service itself on a monopoly basis, or refuses to grant a zoning variance to
a business ... state legislative action will be necessary to insure that a
federal court will not subsequently decide that the activity was not "com-
templated" by the legislature.
10 2
Fred T. Witt, Jr. '79
102. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1151 (1978).
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